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1. Introduction
When proposing to tax energy, environmental economists have several objectives in mind: (i)
the control of CO2 emissions, one of the principal gases to global warming; (ii) to raise the
scarcity price of an exhaustible resource (fossil fuel), the burning of it is a major source of
CO2; (iii) to improve energy efficiency by enhancing R&D activities for a more efficient use
of energy; (iv) to reduce other air pollutants like SO2, NOX or particulates by using less
energy or by investing in abatement measures if SO2 is the tax base. Much of the literature on
an energy or carbon tax has been concerned with the question of what level of a tax is
required to achieve a given goal (e.g. a reduction of CO2 emissions by 20% in 2005).
However, in view of the exhaustion of fossil fuel and the tendency towards a catastrophic CO2
accumulation in the atmosphere (whatever comes first), the time path of the tax is of more
interest than just its level. The CO2 problem presents a classical problem in intertemporal
choice.1 Should we start with a high CO2 tax to delay depletion and CO2 emissions and then
reduce it over time, or should we start with a lower tax level which then should rise over
time,2 or maybe the tax should rise first and then fall.3
There is a substantial literature on resource use and economic activity with
accumulative pollution. 4 In the prototype of pollution control models economic benefits
depend positively on emissions (via production and consumption) and negatively on the
pollution stock level. Of interest are time paths that maximize the present value of welfare
taking into account the effects of accumulative pollution on production possibilities and utility
from consumption. 5 Some papers look at pollution and optimal capital accumulation and
others at pollution and optimal investment in cleaning-up activities. Since pollution is
essentially a problem of missing markets, the emission fee corresponds to the value of the co-
                                                                
1 See Nordhaus (1982).
2 As is the case in Plourde (1972), Dasgupta (1982), van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991).
3 As is the case in Ulph and Ulph (1994).
4 The seminal article on the dynamics of pollution control is by Keeler et al. (1972).
5 See Plourde (1972), Forster (1977) or Conrad and Olson (1992).
2state variable, i.e. to the social price of an additional unit of pollution. Most studies address
only the stock externality (CO2) and not the exhaustibility of a resource (fossil fuel). In those
studies economic activity and pollution converge to a steady state in which the (constant) flow
of additions to the pollution stock is offset by the environment’s assimilative capacity. 6 In all
studies the shadow price of the resource is interpreted as a pollution tax. The government
controls quantities but not the path of a tax to achieve optimal allocation. The price
mechanism is not at work to influence producer and consumer behavior.
Our approach differs from the standard approach which can be found in the literature.
First, it is not the kind of macro-approach, where the utility of energy enters into a
government's objective function and where the country incurs cost of exploration. We
consider a profit maximizing firm which uses energy as one of its inputs to produce sectoral
output. The firm is therefore not a mining company nor does the government own the mine.
The firm has to buy energy from a resource country and has to pay taxes on it to its domestic
government. The government maximizes a welfare function where consumer and producer
surplus, environmental damage and tax revenues are part of the welfare function. Second, its
control variable is not a quantity like consumption or energy consumption but an energy tax.
The components of the energy tax and its path depend on the constraints the economy faces.
One constraint is that energy use contributes to exhausting the CO2-fill capacity of the
atmosphere. Although this is a global problem, the government does not take a free-rider
position but favors unilateral actions. If absorption of CO2 is of a significant order, the
problem can be addressed in the context of a renewable resource. Then it is possible to study
the optimal path of the tax towards a steady state, to explore the property of this steady state
and to do comparative statics.
Third, we add the constraint to our model that fossil energy is also a non-renewable
resource. The linkage of energy use to two stock variables is not new, of course (e.g. Ulph and
Ulph (1994)), but our approach is it because we assume that although the government is
neither the owner of the stock of fossil fuel nor is it able to solve the CO2 problem as well as
the energy exhaustion problem by a unilateral action, it wishes to contribute to
                                                                
6 There are many extensions of the prototype model. In Tahvonen (1995), damage depends also on the rate of the
stock accumulation. Tahvonen (1997) extends the stock pollution problem by including a non-polluting backstop
technology. The topic in Toman and Palmer (1997) is how an accumulative pollutant should be phased out over
time (e.g. toxic waste). Tarcin and Tahvonen (1996) replace the assumption of a constant rate of decay of
atmospheric carbon by two different models of decay and show that this extension changes the basic dynamic
properties of the optimal carbon tax. In Toman and Withagen (2000) the exhaustion of the assimilation capacity
of the environment by pollution accumulation results in a non-convexity of the problem that gives rise to
multiple potential optima.
3the solution of these problems by introducing an energy tax. It is benevolent in the sense that
it is, in addition to the unilateral action with respect to global warming, concerned about the
limited availability of fossil fuel resources in the near future. It is an interesting result of our
approach that a government of a country without resources of coal or crude oil, knowing only
about the profit-maximizing behavior of their firms, will choose the same tax structure as in
Ulph and Ulph (1994) where a resource owning government chooses energy consumption in a
macro-economic framework.
Instead of carrying out a detailed technical analysis of the properties of an optimal
path of the tax, we fourthly introduce in our base model the aspect that part of energy is
wasted due to inefficient use of it. More effort in order to reduce the waste contributes to the
conservation of the stock of fossil energy and prolongs the time span the CO2-fill capacity is
exhausted. We show how the tax has to be modified to become a first-best instrument which
is then in addition also an incentive to raise efforts (e.g. R&D expenditure on energy saving
equipment). And fifthly, we take into account that fossil fuel is also the source of another air
pollutant, SO2. The impact of SO2 on the environment (e.g. acid rain) can be mitigated by
investing in abatement measures. We therefore introduce in addition to the energy tax a SO2
tax to cope with the damage from the accumulation of two stock pollutants. Although one
could expect a complicated mix of tax interactions, the tax rules turn out to be very simple.
2. CO2 Emissions as an Intertemporal Resource Allocation Problem
2.1 The capacity of the atmosphere for CO2 as a resource
We treat CO2 emissions as waste disposal which decumulates a landfill for CO2 deposits in
the atmosphere. With DE  we denote the critical deposit capacity of the atmosphere for CO2.
If DE  is reached this is equivalent to waste disposal when the landfill is full. CO2 emissions
which are right now in the atmosphere are ( )P t , and the resource ( )R t  we want to preserve
is
(1) ( ) ( )R t DE P t= -
that is, ( )R t  is the capacity left for future CO2 emissions. The change in pollution over time
is
4(2) ( ) ( ( ))P e E G P e E G DE R t= × - = × - -&
where E is energy (fossil fuel) and e is a CO2 emission coefficient. ( )G P  is the natural
growth of the CO2 fill capacity due to the absorption from the atmosphere to other carbon
sinks (mainly the ocean). It is ( ) 0PG P > , or, in terms of ( ( )), 0RG DE R t G- <  which
means that the higher the CO2 storage capacity, the less CO2 exists for pollution decay.
Therefore, the pollution variable ( )P t  causes a permanent reduction of CO2 fill capacity in
the atmosphere:
(3)
120
( ) ( ( ) ( ( )))
t
t
P t e E s G DE R s ds
- +
= × - -ò
where 0 120t = -  is the approximate duration time of a CO2-unit in the atmosphere. Because
of (1) and (2), ( )R t&  is
(4) ( )R P G DE R e E= - = - - ×& & .
Since we can not control what has happened in the past, CO2 emissions at 0t =  are given,
(5)
0
120
(0) ( )P R t dt
-
= -ò &
and so is the resource stock (0) (0)R DE P= - .7 The objective of environmental policy is to
extend the final time T until a backstop technology is available. At time T the inequality
(6) ( ) (0) ( ) 0R T R P T= - ³
                                                                
7 We do not intend to model a policy that increase the capacity (0)R , that is ( )E G DE R< - .
5should hold. When the capacity for CO2 fill is under control, either the capacity is exhausted
( ( ) 0)R T =  or some capacity is left ( ( ) 0)R T > , but not used anymore for CO2 emissions.
For the years after T a steady state situation must hold, that is
(7) ( ) 0R t =& or ( ( )) ( )G DE R t e E t- = × for t T>
or a backstop technology is available. In principle we could think of two state variables, the
capacity still available in the atmosphere, ( )R t , and the pollution stock ( )P t  that has
accumulated over the centuries. However, assuming that extracting capacity equals the net
accumulation of CO2 emissions, that is (4), there is thus only one stock variable and ( )E t  is
our control variable to preserve the CO2 fill capacity ( )R t . Since all countries contribute to
the CO2 problem, E should be the aggregated energy consumption. Since we wish to analyze
the CO2 tax policy of a single country, we assume that energy consumption of the rest of the
world is constant and included in DE .
2.2 Maximizing the performance of the economy by choosing the path of a CO2 tax
In order to find the time profile of the resource price, the government maximizes the present
value of the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus and of the ecological surplus which
consists of CO2 tax revenues minus damage from global warming:
(8)   
{ }
( )
( )
0 0
max ( ) ( ), , ( ) ( )
E
E
xT
rt
E E Et
e p d C x DE R PE E D DE R dt
t
t
V V t t t-
ì üï ïé ù- - + × - -í ýë ûï ïî þ
ò ò .
It is Et  the energy tax rate, ( )Ex t  is output of the energy intensive industry, ( )p x  is the
market demand function for energy intensive goods, ( )D DE R-  is the damage caused from
global warming ( 0)RD < ,
8 r is the discount factor, and ( )C ×  is a cost function with PE as the
price for energy which is the only variable input price. The resource stock variable enters the
                                                                
8 The case of a catastrophe if 0R ®  could be considered by a damage function DE RD
R
æ ö-
ç ÷
è ø
 where damage
and marginal damage become extremely high when 0R ® .
6cost function and represents the aspect that more pollution, that is a reduction in the CO2 fill
capacity R, will raise the cost of production; hence 0RC < . Possible negative productivity
effects follow from the state of health, flooding or hurricanes. If we extend the model by
including more industries, than R would also affect the productivity in agriculture.
The government is a Stackelberg leader and has perfect information on producer’s
behavior, that is, supply x is derived from profit maximizing behavior under perfect
competition:
(9) max , , ( )Ex p x C x DE R PEp t
é ù= × - -ë û
and cost minimizing energy demand E is derived from , , ( )PE EC E x DE R PE té ù= -ë û
(Shephard’s lemma). From the FOC of (9), i.e. xp C= , follows that supply x depends also on
R and ( )EPE t , hence ( , , ( ))Ex x p DE R PE t= - . The government wishes to control the
energy demand by choosing a time path of the control variable ( )E tt . This tax affects not
only E, but also substitution of other inputs for E, marginal costs, and supply and demand.
The current value of the Hamiltonian for the problem (8) subject to (4) is:
(10)     
( )
0
( ) ( ), , ( ) ( )
Ex
E E E RH p d C x DE R PE E D DE R q R
t
V V t t té ù= - - + × - - + ×ë ûò &
where Rq  is the current value of the resource price or user cost.
9 After substitution of the
dynamic constraint (4) into (10), the FOC are,10 assuming an interior solution,
(11) 0 and
E R R R
H q r q Ht = = -&
                                                                
9 Since energy E is derived from Shephard’s lemma, it therefore depends on the same variables as the cost
function.
10 We suppress the time subscript t in , ( )t RH q t  and ( )E tt  although all variables depend on t.
7and the dynamic constraint, recovered from the Hamiltonian, 11
(12) ( )
Rq
R H G DE R e E= = - - ×& .
The maximum principle yields
( ) 0
E x E R
E E E E
x d PE d E d E
H p C E E q e
d d dt
t
t t t t
¶
= - - + + - × =
¶
where 0
E E E
d E E E x
d xt t t
¶ ¶ ¶
= + <
¶ ¶ ¶
. Since xp C=  and 0 EPE PE t= + , we obtain E Re qt = × ;
the energy tax is a CO2 tax and proportional to the resource price Rq  of the remaining
capacity for CO2 storage. Thus Rq  represents the shadow cost of CO2 or, equivalently, the
benefit from an incremental amount of avoided CO2 (a small increase of the CO2 storage
capacity).12 The portfolio balance condition in (11) yields:13
(13) ( )R R R R Rq r G q C D= - + +& .
There is a tendency of the tax rate to grow at the rate Rr G+ , but there is also a tendency for
it to decline over time because an extra amount of CO2 later on would inflict marginal
damages over a shorter time horizon.
2.3 Basic Characteristics of the CO2 tax
For the interpretation of the slope of the optimal time path of qR we consider four case:
                                                                
11 We could also postulate by an additional restriction that the critical concentration DE  must not be exceeded
by time T and maintained after that point in time by adding the inequality restriction ( ) 0R t t T³ " ³ . Then
for t T³  we must form the Lagrangian L H Rh= + × . The term h  complicates the matter and we neglect this
aspect (see Goulder and Mathai (2000)).
12 In most of the literature the shadow value of an unit of CO2 is negative since damage is a function of the stock
of accumulated CO2; i.e. D(P) , so that CO2 is a “bad” from the social planer’s perspective. In this paper, the CO2
capacity of the atmosphere is a “good” and the shadow value qR is therefore positive.
13 We omit the term ( )E R Rq e Et- - ×  which is zero because of E Rq et = ×  and the term ( )x Rp C x-  because of
xp C= .
8(i) 0 , 0Rr G= = : The CO2 tax is falling since a unit of CO2 emitted today reduces the CO2
fill capacity at all future dates,and so the increase in the cost of production ( 0)RC <  as well
as the increase in damage from global warming ( 0)RD <  is greater than a unit of CO2
emitted at any later date. Therefore a unit today should be taxed more heavily than a unit
tomorrow. The required intertemporal adjustment is brought about if the tax falls at exactly
the rate of marginal damage from global warming and from its negative impact on production.
(ii) 0 , 0Rr G= < : If a fraction of CO2 emitted today is absorbed, this reduces future
marginal damage. Therefore, the aspect described above is somewhat mitigated, and the tax
could fall at a lower rate.
(iii) 0 , 0 ,R Rr G C> <  and RD  small: This is the situation at the beginning of the planning
period. The tax is low and rising. The CO2 emissions contribute to social welfare due to the
use of energy in production. If the value qR of the CO2 fill capacity increases less than
postulated in (13), then more CO2 should be emitted to raise today’s social welfare from
material wellbeing.
(iv) 0 , 0 ,R Rr G C> <  and RD  high: If a steady state is out of reach then the damage and
cost aspects from a low CO2 fill capacity might finally dominate and it is thus possible for the
optimal carbon tax to decline over time. As shown by Goulder and Mathai (2000), under
standard assumptions on ( )G ×  and ( )D × the optimal carbon tax will rise forever, if the
optimized path of CO2 slopes upward. The standard assumptions are
( ) ( ), 0, 0, 0, 0R RR RG DE R DE R D D Cd d- = × - > < > <  and 0RRC > . Following
Goulder and Mathai, the integration of (13) yields
(14) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
T
r s t
R R R
t
q t C DE R s D DE R s e dsd
=¥
- + -é ù= - - + - ×ë ûò
where we have to assume additive separability in C between R and Et  (i.e. , 0RR qC = ) to make
CR independent of Rq . This equation states that the shadow cost of a CO2-unit equals the
discounted sum of the two marginal damages to production and the environment that this unit
would inflict over all future time. Substituting ( )Rq t  into (13) yields
9(15)      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )r t r sR R R R R
t
q r e C R s D R s e ds C R t D R td dd
¥
+ - += + - + × + +é ùë ûò& .
If CR and DR were constant, then the first term on the right hand side would reduce to
[ ]R RC D- + , and the tax would also be constant since 0Rq =& . If ( )R s  decreases with s t> ,
i.e. CO2 emissions will increase even under an optimal policy, as environmental economists
expect, then the convex damage and cost functions ensure that the first term in the Rq&
equation would be larger than the second term and the slope of the tax path would be positive.
If we substitute Re q×  for Et  in the two equations for R& ((12)) and for Rq&  ((13)), we
obtain a system of two differential equations in the two unknowns R and Rq . They are
necessary conditions that govern the motion of an optimal program. The system must know,
in addition, where it is going or where it should start. (0)R  is given by the state of the CO2
fill capacity at the beginning. Yet the determination of (0)Rq  is obviously crucial. If the
terminal values of ( )R T  and ( )Rq T  are known, then it would be possible to use the
equations of motion to trace back through time to find the appropriate (0) ( (0))E Re qt = ×  to
get the CO2 reduction program off to the “right start”. For this purpose transversality
conditions are used.
We first assume that absorption can be neglected ( 0)G » . Then we can distinguish
two cases at the final time T:
a) ( ) 0 , ( ) 0RR T q T= > .
The capacity of the resource is exhausted at T and the resource stock must have no value
according to the transversality condition ( ) ( ) 0Rq T R T× = . From the second transversality
condition, ( ) 0H T = , we obtain
[ ]
0
( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
x
R RH T p d C q T D DE q T G DEz z= - × - + × =ò
Consumer and producer surplus plus the value of the (minor) absorption capacity is equal to
damage. From this condition ( )Rq T  can be determined. Since no CO2 emissions are
10
permitted after period ( 0)T R =& , fossil fuel is not an essential input anymore because a
carbon-free technology is available at T, or energy can be produced from renewable resources
(solar-, wind- or hydropower-energy). If we introduce the possibility of some absorption after
T, then ( 1)Rq T +  follows from
(16)   0( , ), , ( )E Re E x p DE PE e q G DEté ù× + × =ë û .
Since supply is a function of Rq  as ,E Re q xt = ×  is also determined from (16), given p. The
tax restricts energy demand such that 0R =& .
b) ( ) 0 , ( ) 0RR T q T> = .
Now we exclude the case a) (a corner solution) that pollution will ever reach its critical limit,
and assume ( ) 0R T > . This situation will occur if marginal cost and marginal damage
become extremely high if 0R ® . When temperature increases up to a threshold value,
derived from DE , damage increases sharply. Then a catastrophe occurs if an (uncertain) level
of the stock variable (pollution or aggregated extraction of the CO2-fill capacity) is exceeded.
The specification of a damage function 
DE R
D
R
æ ö-
ç ÷
è ø
 would reflect such a situation where
0R ® . If we consider the CO2-fill capacity R as a non-renewable resource ( ( )G ×  is small or
zero), then the transversality condition ( ) ( ) 0Rq T R T× =  must be satisfied at a final time T if
such a time exists. Since ( ) 0R T > , the resource price of the remaining stock has fallen to
zero, i.e. ( ) 0Rq T = . The absorption capacity can not be used anymore because a catastrophe
might occur. The second transversality condition postulates that the current value of the
performance indicator (H) must be zero at T; i.e. ( ) 0H T = . This implies according to (10)
that consumer and producer surplus is equal to damage from global warming (it is
( ) ( ) 0E RT e q Tt = × =  at T) and the government terminates the program (no energy tax
anymore). ( ) 0H T =  can be solved for ( )R T  and after T a backstop technology must be
available. Permitting some absorption, a resource price Rq  after T should control (16) (with
( )DE R T-  instead of DE ).
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c) A steady state with * *, RR q .
If we assume that absorption is not irrelevant then we can analyse a steady state. The steady
state tax *Et  and the resource stock 
*R  follow from (13) with 0Rq =&  and from (7) with
0R =& , i.e. (16) with *DE R-  instead of DE . The tax is
(17) * * R RE R
R
C D
e q
r G
t
+
= = -
-
where CR, DR and GR are functions of *R . Since RG  is very small (about –1 percent), the tax
rate is the present value of all the increased production and damage costs arising from burning
a bit more fossil energy today. The tax captures the present value of the future added costs
from energy consumption not incident on a private energy intensive firm, but on the other
energy consuming firms and the society. 14
In models where the social planner maximizes the stream of utility from energy use by
choosing an optimal path of fossil fuel extraction, he implicitly also determines the optimal
path of a CO2 tax because the co-state variable is equivalent to a CO2 tax if markets are
perfectly competitive. In our model the social planer maximizes the performance of the
economy by choosing only the optimal path of a CO2 tax. Energy consumption is determined
indirectly by the agents’ cost-minimizing behavior.
2.4 A Phase Diagram for the Steady State
If we believe that in the near future a high percentage of energy is produced from carbon-free
resources, then a standard phase diagram could be used to show the dynamics of the stock R
and the energy tax around the steady state. Figure 1 presents the result of the analysis.
                                                                
14 If the two transversality conditions cannot be satisfied, then the program will have to run forever. This is
typically the case for renewable resources that can be characterized in final steady state with ( , )Rq R  positive.
For these, transversality is satisfied in the limit as T ® ¥ :  ( ) ( ) 0, ( ) 0rT rT
R
e q T R T e H T- -× = = .
12
Fig. 1 The dynamics of the CO2  fill capacity R and of the resource price or CO2 tax qR
To show the motions of R and Rq  off the steady state 
* *( , )RR q , we first determine for the
steady state ( 0)R Rq d q R d R= = = =& && &  the slope of the 0Rq =&  equation and of the 0R =&
equation:15
(18) 0 : 0RR
d q
q
d R
= <& ,  
(19) 0 : 0R
d q
R
d R
= >& .
For the motions off the steady state we obtain for the 0Rq =&  equation
(20) 0 , 0R R
R
q q
q R
¶ ¶
> >
¶ ¶
& &
and for the 0R =&  equation
(21)  0 , 0
R
R R
q R
¶ ¶
> <
¶ ¶
& &
.
                                                                
15 The signs are proven in the Appendix, assuming standard specifications of () , ()and ( )C G D× × × .
.C
A
g
+
-
-
+
-
-
-
+
+
+
-
-
-
+
+
+
+
E
qR
*q
*R
0Rq =&
0R =&
R
B
g
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As shown in Figure 1, the control variable Et , which corresponds to Re q× , is used to guide R
from (0)R  (given exogenously) to *R  (solved for) in an optimal way. Let us assume that
today there is enough capacity for CO2 deposit, i.e. (0)R  is to the right of *R . If society is in
A (i.e. (0), (0)Rq R ), this corresponds to case (iii) in section 2.3; R is high and RD  is
negligible. Then a raising tax leads to the steady state. If society is in B, this corresponds to
case (iv); R is low and RD  is high. A falling tax and an increasing R (i.e. less CO2 emissions)
are in line with Goulder and Mathei’s (2000) analysis of a declining tax under less CO2
emissions, and a steady state will be reached. If society is in C, the tax is too low and
immediate command and control regulations are required to stabilize the situation.
2.5 Comparative Statics
We next want to analyze the system, consisting of the maximum principle, E Re qt = × , the
dynamic constraint (12) and the portfolio balance condition (14). For that purpose we have to
assume functional forms for ( ), ( , , )EG DE R C x DE R t- -  and ( )D DE R- :
(22) ( ) ( ), 0G DE R DE Rd d- = - >
(23)
1
0( ) ( ),h EC x c PE t× = × +
i.e. we omit the productivity externality from DE R- ;
(24) 2
1
( ) ( )
2
D DE R DE Rg- = - .
d  in (22) is a parameter for natural mitigation, h < 1 in (23) is the degree of homogeneity of
the production function and expresses decreasing returns to scale. The damage function in
(24) is quadratic with 0g >  as a damage parameter. From ( )p MC= × , we obtain
14
(25)
1
h
hh p
x
c
-×é ù= ê úë û
.
Energy demand E can be derived from Shephard’s lemma, using the specification of the cost
function in (23) and then replacing x by its expression, derived in (25). This yields:
(26)
1
1
( )
( )
h
PE R
R
h p
E c q
c q
-é ù×
= ê ú
ë û
.
Since 0RC = , (13) reduces to
(27) ( ) ( ) ( , )R R Rq r q DE R q q Rd g= + - × - =& .
The second equation of motion ((27) is the first one) is
(28) ( ) ( ) ( , )RR DE R e E R q Rd= - - × × =&
with ( )E ×  as given in (26). The steady state solution * *( , )RR q  can be obtained by setting
0Rq R= =&&  in (27) and (28).
For comparative statics with respect to the exogenous variables , ,r d g  and p we
consider the two-equation system for the steady state, i.e. (27) and (28):
(29) * *( ) ( ) 0Rr q DE Rd g+ - × - =
(30) * *( , ) ( ) 0Re E q DE Rd- × × + × - =
To find 
* *
or
d q d R
d r d r
 we have to solve these two equations simultaneously after having
injected some d r. The differentiation of these equations with respect to the two endogenous
variables * *( , )q R  and the exogenous variable in question (r) yields:
15
(31) * * * * *( ) , 0
RR R q R
r d q d R q d r e E d q d Rd g d+ + × = - - × - × = .
The solution is:16
(32)
* *
0 , 0R
d q d R
d r d r
< < .
A higher interest rate depresses the steady state capital value *Rq  of the CO2-fill capacity and
lowers its level. The emphasis is on production and profit now and not later, and therefore on
a lower CO2 tax and less CO2-fill capacity.
In a similar way, we can find out how *Rq  and 
*R  respond to changes in d :
(33)
* *
0 , 0R
d q d R
d dd d
< >  .
More absorption of CO2 by the biosphere will increase the CO2-fill capacity and permits to
lower the tax rate.
If damage parameter g  changes, we obtain:
(34)
* *
0 , 0R
d q d R
d dg g
> > .
This again confirms intuition. If damage from CO2 emissions is higher, then *R  and the CO2
tax should be higher too. Finally, a change in the output price p leads to the following
response:
(35)
* *
0 , 0R
d q d R
d p d p
> < .
The higher output level in the steady state if p increases calls for a higher tax rate. More
                                                                
16 For technical details see the Appendix.
16
output raises energy demand which implies a lower CO2-fill capacity.
3. Intertemporal Allocation of Fossil Fuel as a Non-Renewable Resource and as a
Source of CO2 Emissions
In this section we state a dynamic optimization problem with two state variables: R(t), the
CO2 fill capacity; RF(t), the level of the stock of fossil fuel at time t (crude oil, coal, natural
gas). The government selects values for the control variable ( )E tt  for t = 0, 1, ...T so as to
maximize
   
{ }
( )
0( )
0 0
max ( ) ( , , ) ( )
E
E
xT
rt
E Et
W e p d C x DE R PE E D DE R d t
t
t
z z t t-
ì üï ï= - - + + × - -í ý
ï ïî þ
ò ò
subject to the constraints
(36) ( ) ( )R G DE R e E= - - × ×&
(37)
0
( ) , (0)
T
RF E RF E dt= - × ³ ò& .
Ulph and Ulph (1994) construct such a model with a CO2 stock externality which is related to
the use of a non-renewable resource. But in their model an agency maximizes the present
value of a stream of utility where utility depends on consumption of energy. It also exploits its
own resource by choosing an optimal time path of extraction. In our model the government is
concerned about the negative externalities from the derived demand for energy. Although it
does not own the stock of the non-renewable resource, it knows that production of goods in its
country contributes via energy use to the exhaustion of world wide fossil fuel reserves. The
energy tax therefore addresses not only the problem of global warming but also the problem
that fossil fuels will be exhausted in the near future.17
The current-value Hamiltonian is
                                                                
17 As the rest of the world also consumes energy, we had to subtract also this energy use in (37). Since we are not
interested in doing numerical simulation of a world model we assume this consumption to be constant and for
simplicity, zero.
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( )
0
( ) ( ) ( )
Ex
E R RFH p d C E D DE R q R q RF
t
z z t= - × + × - - + + ×ò & &
and the maximum principle yields
( ) 0
E E R RF
E
d E
H q e q
dt
t
t
= - × - = .
The energy tax consists of the shadow price of CO2 pollution, Rq e× , and of the shadow price
of fossil fuel, qRF , which in our model is received by the resource-concerned government but
not by the owner of the resource:
(38) E R RFq e qt = × + .
From the portfolio balance condition R R Rq r q H= -&  we obtain
(39) ( )R R R R R R E R RF Rq r q C D q G q e q Et= + + - + - + × +&
which reduces to the same condition as in (13). From the second portfolio condition,
RF RF RFq r q H= -& , we obtain
(40) RF RFq r q= ×& .
The optimal tax Et  in (38) derived from our approach, is in principle the same as obtained by
Ulph and Ulph (1994). It is known that perfect competition on the resource market with price
taking resource suppliers will result in the same price and quantity paths like those chosen by
a planer. In our model, however, we consider firms under perfect competition which produce
anything except of being a mining firm. They use energy which could be supplied under any
kind of market structure.
The change of the tax over time is E R RFq e qt = × +& & &  or, if we use (39), (40), and (38):
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(41) [ ] [ ]( )E R R R R RF E R R R Re r G q C D r q r e G q C Dt t= - + + + = × + - + +& .
As for the slope of the energy tax we could repeat the argument by Goulder and Mathai
(2000), presented in (14) and (15), by saying that the tax path will be upward sloping because
RFq  rises according to Hotelling’s rule and Rq  rises because we expect that accumulated CO2
emissions will steadily increase. This sufficient condition for an upward sloping path of Et
might not hold if the model takes into account that the source of CO2 emissions is exhaustible
fossil fuel. Since it can be shown that 0x <&  and 0E <& , it is possible that finally
( ) ( )R s R t s t> " >  and the tax path then becomes downward sloping, a possibility also
described by Ulph and Ulph (1994). Since it is difficult to derive general conclusions for this
kind of model, we therefore discuss only some cases that might occur.
a) ( ) 0 , ( ) 0 , ( ) 0.RR T q T G= > × =
As the CO2-fill capacity is exhausted at T, no fossil fuel can be used after T. Therefore, an
optimal extraction path requires that ( ) 0RF T = . From (3), (6) and (37) follows that
obviously (0) ( ) (0)e RF P T R× = =  holds. The tax ( )E Tt  solves the second transversality
condition:
(42)
( )
0
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) 0
Ex
EH T p d C D DE
t
z z t= - × - =ò ;
the sum of producer and consumer surplus at T is equal to damage. After T, energy is
produced by a backstop technology.
b) ( ) 0 , ( ) 0 , ( ) 0RR T q T G> = × = .
In this case, damage becomes catastrophic and emissions are not permitted anymore. Again,
fossil fuel should be exhausted at T, i.e. ( ) 0RF T = . This time, from (3), (7) and (37) follows
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(43)
0 0
( ) (0) , ( ) ( )
T T
E dt RF e E dt DE R T× = × × = -ò ò
and therefore ( ) (0)R T DE e RF= - × . Then the tax ( )E Tt  solves ( ) 0H T =  with
( ( ))D DE R T-  in (42).
c) ( ) 0 , ( ) 0 , ( ) 0 , ( ) 0RFRF T q T R T G= > > × = .
This case represents the aspect that the stock of fossil fuel is exhausted before global warming
becomes a serious problem. ( )R T  can be determined similarly as in case b), and so can
( )E Tt .
d) A steady state  * *, with ( ) 0 and 0RR q G RF× > > .
With absorption, the CO2 problem has reached a steady state before the resource RF is
exhausted. Then 
*
*
*
( )
( )
R
R
R
D DE R
q
r G DE R
- -
=
- -
 from (39) ( 0)Rq =&  together with
(44) * * *( ) ( ),R RF R RFG DE R e E x q e q q e qé ù- = × × + × +ë û
have to be solved for *R  and *Rq .
18 It is * ( )RFR R q=  and RFq  must keep 
*R  constant. The
tax component RFq  is therefore no longer on its optimal path.
We could also think of introducing two control variables, an energy tax ENt  and a CO2
tax COt . We have to modify the welfare function by defining 0 EN COPE PE et t= + + ×  and
by introducing two types of tax revenues. From 0
EN
Ht =  we obtain
E CO R RFe q e qt t+ × = × + , and from 0COHt =  we obtain this condition again. Since qR and
qRF follow the same path in each FOC, there is no need to have an energy tax as well as a
CO2-tax. Welfare can not be improved by choosing two instruments.
                                                                
18 For simplicity we assume that ( )C ×  does not depend on DE R-  anymore.
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It is important to note that our restriction to one industry is not a restriction of
generality of the results. If we affix an index i for industry i to p, C, x and E, and introduce a
sum over i in the welfare function at the beginning of this section and in (36) and (37), the tax
formula (38) is the same, i.e. independent on the number and size of industries. If , 0i RC = ,
then also the equation of motion of qR is the same and so is (40). If , 0i RC < , then
(45) ,( )R R R i R R
i
q q r G C D= - + +å& .
The stock externalities on the costs of production lower the slope of R
R
q
q
&
, that is, the initial
level of the CO2 tax should be higher.19
To our knowledge, all authors look at a mining firm or at a government which owns
the resource. If all countries are interested in reducing CO2 and in conserving fossil fuel,
however, then it is irrelevant whether the use of fossil fuel is taxed or the extraction of it. The
path of the tax is the same. Not the same is the distributional effect between the suppliers and
users of fossil fuel.20 If producers charge the CO2 tax and/or the royalty, they obtain the
revenues. If the user country charges a tax, then the consumers of the user countries benefit
from the recycling of the tax revenue. The resource supplier receives only the price they can
receive on the resource market ( 0PE  in our model). We have not modeled the first phase of a
resource model, i.e. the policy of the country that owns the resource. If extraction costs do not
depend on the stock RF, then the price path 0 0PE r PE= ×&  follows the Hotelling rule. With
mitigation policies in the user countries, the price 0PE  does not depend on Et . This can lead
to the curious result that the governments of the user countries have higher revenues from
taxing oil and gas than the producer countries earn from selling their resources. In our model
the government of a resource importing country raises the tax on the stock externality, the
revenue of it is recycled to the consumers. There is therefore a rent-transfer of (0) ERF t×  in
favor of the importers. If the oil producer would internalise at the well the stock externality in
their price and extraction policy of fossil fuel, this would change the distributional outcome
under a CO2 mitigation policy.
                                                                
19 See also the higher value of ( )Rq t  in (14) if marginal damage to production increases.
20 See Blanck and Ströbele (1995) on this point.
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4. On the Improvement of Energy Efficiency in an Intertemporal Setting
We first consider an industry which uses “gross” energy E as an input for producing output x.
By gross energy we mean energy input with a byproduct “waste of energy” which reduces the
efficiency of the production process. We distinguish between gross energy E and net energy
input NE where
(46) (1 ) , 0 1 , andNE E WE Ea a a= - × £ £ = ×
with WE as waste of energy and a  as the waste coefficient or coefficient of energy
inefficiency. To improve energy efficiency, i.e. to reduce the waste coefficient, is costly
because it requires time and effort, and hence causes costs of labor and material. We denote
with ef the effort to reduce the waste of energy and assume ( )efa  to be a function of this
effort ( ( ) 0, ( ) 0)ef efa a¢ ¢¢< > . Effort ef could be the intensity of R&D activities to
improve energy efficiency. The cost of energy, including the energy tax, is 0( )EPE Et+ ×
which is equivalent to 0
1 ( )
EPE NE
ef
t
a
+
×
-
, using (46). Energy NE is the input quantity which
enters a production function for x as a frontier for efficient production, and the tax Et  can be
used as a policy instrument to raise energy efficiency.
Next we define the price of energy to be
(47) 0( , )
1 ( )
E
E
PE
PE ef
ef
t
t
a
+
=
-
with
(48) 02 ( ) 0(1 )ef E
PE PE
a
t
a
¢
= + <
-
i.e. effort ef reduces the price for the efficient energy input NE. If we choose a cost function
with PE as one of the input prices (the other prices are constant), then the problem of the firm
or industry under perfect competition is
22
(49)
,
max ( , ( , ), )Exef p x C x PE ef efp t= × -
with PE as defined in (47). Lower output on the production side from the WE-reducing effect
of effort ef is expressed in terms of 0efC >  and , 0ef efC >  on the cost side. An
environmentally friendly production process with emphasis on energy conservation increases
the cost for producing x. The benefit is a lower price PE due to energy efficiency of the input
energy.
The FOC with respect to x is:
(50) ( , , ) 0xp C x PE ef- =
and the FOC with respect to e is:
(51) 0ef efNE PE C- × - =
because of Shephard’s Lemma ( )PENE C= . According to (51), the level of ef is optimal if
marginal savings in the cost of energy justifies exactly the increase in the cost of producing
output x with a more energy efficient technology. efPE  is negative because an increase in
effort reduces waste of energy and this energy augmenting effect raises net energy NE. In
order to determine the effect of a change in the energy tax Et  on production, effort and
energy wasted, the equations (50) and (51) have to be differentiated totally. 21 The effect we
are interested in is:
(52) 0
E
d ef
d t
>  .
We assume that the government knows this positive effect of an energy tax and write
( )Eef ef t=  as the solution of (51).
22
We next are interested in the structure and the optimal path of the energy tax Et
                                                                
21 See Conrad (2000).
22 We assume a homothetic production process so that x in (51) cancels out.
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which should take into account the accumulation of CO2, the scarcity of the non-renewable
resource energy, and in addition the potential of being an incentive for improving energy
efficiency. The objective function of the government is
(53)
{ }
]
( )
( )
0 0
0
max ( ) ( , ( , ( )), )
( )
E
E
xT
rt
E Et
E
e p d C x PE ef ef
E PE WE D DE R dt
t
t
z z t t
t
- é -ê
êë
+ × - × - -
ò ò
subject to (36) and (37).23 Since the use of “gross” energy E produces CO2 emissions and
contributes to the exhaustion of fossil fuels, the dynamic constraints (36) and (37) do not
reflect the benefit of a better fuel efficiency. This aspect enters the objective function in (53)
by subtracting the cost of wasted energy as a “bad” for the economy. The task of the energy
tax is to reduce also waste because that contributes to mitigate the CO2 emission problem and
the energy scarcity. The Hamiltonian is
(54)
( )
0
0
( ) ( , ( , ( )); )
( )
Ex
E E E
R RF
H p d C x PE ef ef E
PE WE D DE R q R q RF
t
z z t t t= - + ×
- × - - + × + ×
ò
& &
and the maximum principle requires24
(55) 0 0E R RE
E E E E E
d H d E dWE d E d E
PE e q q
d d d d d
t
t t t t t
= - - × - = .
This yields the components of an optimal path of an energy tax Et :
                                                                
23 For simplicity we assume that R does not enter the cost function.
24 We made use of (50) and (51) in order to end up with this shorter expression; for further details see the
Appendix.
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(56) 0
( ( ) )
E
E R RE
E
d ef E
d
e q q PE d E
d
a
t
t
t
×
= × + +
or, written in terms of the elasticity , 0efae <  of energy inefficiency with respect to effort, the
elasticity , 0Eef th >  of effort with respect to the tax and of the elasticity , 0EE te < of gross
energy demand with respect to the tax:25
(57) , ,0
,
1 E
E
ef ef
E R RE
E
e q q PE a t
t
e h
t a
e
é ù×
= × + + × +ê ú
ê úë û
.
If we neglect the aspect of waste ( 0)a = , then the tax is the same as in (38). If energy is
wasted then the tax rate should address in addition to the pollution and resource problem also
the inefficiency problem. The cost of wasted energy, 0PEa × , is multiplied by a factor greater
than one. It would be one only, if the tax has no effect on effort ,( 0)Eef th =  or if effort can
not reduce the waste coefficient ,( 0)efae = . It is intuitively obvious, that the tax should be
higher the more it can influence effort, which in turn is successful in reducing inefficiency in
energy use. If the tax elasticity for energy demand is low, then the factor behind 0PEa ×  must
be higher in order to address the waste problem. 26 The portfolio balance conditions are the
same as in (13) and (40) except that 0RC =  because we have dropped for simplicity the
aspect that R has an impact on costs. To obtain the time path of the tax rate Et  we treat the
elasticity term in (57) as a constant and denote it by A. Then
[ ]0 1E R RF E
E
d ef
e q q PE A
d
t a t
t
¢= × + + × +& & & &
                                                                
25 See the Appendix.
26 Using the definition 
1 ( ( ))E
NE
E
efa t
=
-
 , the elasticity , EE te  can be decomposed as
, , , ,1E E EE NE ef eft t a t
a
e e e h
a
= + ×
-
 . The demand for efficient energy use (NE) will be reduced by the tax and the
tax affects effort positively, which lowers the waste of energy.
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or
(58)
01 (1 )
R RF
E
E
e q q
d ef
PE A
d
t
a
t
× +
=
¢- +
& &
& .
Since the numerator is greater than one, the growth rate of the tax is smaller than in the case
0a = . The energy tax starts at a higher level for the benefit of a higher energy efficiency.
Since the equations of the evolution (i.e. for Rq&  and RFq& ) are the same as derived in section 3,
we can repeat the arguments to make the tax rise over time. This implies steadily increasing
efforts to improve energy efficiency by reducing waste of energy because of 0
E
d ef
d t
>  and
( ) 0efa ¢ < . Since 0a ¢¢ > , the numerator in (58) becomes smaller and an inverted U-shape of
the tax is a likely outcome.
5. On the Improvement of Abatement Measures in an Intertemporal Setting
In this section we include also pollutants of energy use which can be abated like SO2 and
NOX. The firm can react to standards and/or emission taxes by factor substitution or by
abatement activities or by both. It has an abatement function and determines the level of the
abatement activity by equating marginal abatement costs to the uniform tax rate on emissions.
The firm produces output x at cost [ ], ( , , )E SOC x PE a t t  where ( )PE ×  consists of the basic
price 0PE , the cost of abatement ca, the cost from taxing non-abated emissions (e.g. SO2) and
the energy tax Et
(59) 0( , , ) (1 )E SO E SO SO SOPE a PE ca a e a et t t t= + + × × + -
( )ca ca a=  is the unit cost of abatement which depends on the degree of abatement activity,
a, (0 1), SOa e£ £  is the emission coefficient of the input energy (e.g. tons of SO2 per ton of
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input) and SOt  is an SO2 emission tax rate. We assume 0aca >  and 0aaca > . The firm
maximizes profit choosing output x and the degree of abatement:
(60) ( )
,
max , ( , , )E SOx a
p x C x PE ap t t= × - .
From the FOC xp C= ; output is a function of the tax rates ( , )E SOx x t t= . Maximizing (60)
with respect to the degree a is equivalent to min ( , , )E SOa PE a t t . The FOC is
(61) ( ) 0a SO SO
d PE
ca a ca e
d a
t= × + - × = ;
that is, marginal cost of abatement is equal to the tax rate. Comparative statics for (61) yields
0
SO
d a
d t
> ; the government can stimulate abatement by raising the tax.
Similarly to section 3 we are interested in the structure and the optimal path of the
energy tax Et . It affects substitution and lowers output (p is fixed) in order to scope with the
CO2 pollution problem and with the resource scarcity. In order to stimulate abatement, the
government introduces another tax SOt . Its path has an impact on substitution, on output
(marginal cost Cx will change) and on abatement. The objective function of the government is
(62)
{ }
( )
( ), ( )
0 0
1 2
max ( ) , ( , , )
(1 ) ( ) ( )
E SO
T x
rt
E SO Et t
SOSO SO SO
W e p d C x PE a E
a e E D DE R D DE R dt
t t
z z t t t
t
- é= - + ×ê
ë
ù+ × - × × - - - - û
ò ò
where analogously to the CO2 accumulation problem SODE  denotes the critical deposit
capacity of the environment for SO2. If the SO2-fill capacity RSO is exhausted, the
acidification of land, forest and lakes will become a very serious problem with hugh damages
to the economy. The dynamic constraints are (36), (37) and
(63) 2 ( ) (1 )SO SO SO SOR G DE R a e E= - - - × ×& .
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We note that PEE C=  and that the government knows that a, x and E are functions of the tax
rates with the corresponding reaction of the firm on their levels
( )( ), ( , ) and ( , )SO E SO E SOa x Et t t t t . The Hamiltonian is
1
0
2
( ) ( , ( ) ) (1 ) ( )
( )
SO
x
E SO SO
SO SO R R SO RF
H p d C x PE E a e E D DE R
D DE R q R q R q RF
z z t t= - × + × + × - × × - -
- - + × + × + ×
ò
& & &
.
Using xp C=  and (61), the FOC 0SOHt =  yields
(64) ( ) (1 ) 0
SO SO
SO
E R CO R SO SO RF R SO SO
SO
d a
d
q e q a e q q e Ed E
d
t
t t t
t
é ù- × - - × - - + - × =ë û .
The second FOC 0
E
Ht =  yields
(65) ( )(1 ) 0SOE SO SO R R CO RFa e q q e qt t+ - × × - - × - = .
A solution of this system (64) and (65) in the two unknown variables Et  and SOt  is:
(66) SO ,SOR E R CO RFq q e qt t= = × + .
As before, the energy tax takes care of the CO2 problem and of the resource scarcity, whereas
the SO2 tax SOt  addresses only the problem of acidification. As we have introduced this time
two instruments instead of only one, we have assigned two problems of market failure to one
tax and the other one to the other tax. In section 4 we had introduced only one tax (see (57))
which had to address three problems all together. Finally, there are three equations of motion
for the resource prices. Since that for 
SOR
q  is similar to the one for Rq , all three shadow prices
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rise over time if both stocks of pollutant increase. Since 0
SO
d a
d t
> , the degree of abatement
will then rise over time. If energy consumption has finally dropped over time to a low level,
and fossil fuel is close to exhaustion, the tax components Rq  and SORq  might become
downward sloping as the stocks of pollutants do not increase anymore. This then mitigates the
effort to abate.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we extend the Hotelling model by including stock externalities (CO2, SO2) and
flow externalities like waste of energy and pollutants which can be abated (SO2) and examine
how an energy (CO2/SO2) tax can be used to address these problems in an optimal way. The
concern about the time profile of an energy tax arises from the facts that fossil fuels are an
exhaustible resource and that global warming, being a consequence of carbon accumulation in
the atmosphere, is a stock externality problem. It has been in response to these concerns that
several authors have addressed the question of the optimal time path of a tax to control the
two stock problems. The objective in these papers has been to design a tax, both in level and
in time profile, as to bring about socially desirable paths of fossil fuel consumption and
carbon accumulation. Unfortunately – and economists are used to that – these studies differ in
their conclusions about the shape of the time path of a carbon tax. The optimal time path is
either inverted U-shaped (e.g. Ulph and Ulph (1994)) or monotonically decreasing (e.g.
Sinclair (1994)). In addition, by specifying a more complex decay of carbon, the tax may as
well be constant through time, increase monotonically, or have a U-shape (Farzin and
Tahvonen (1996)). The objective of this paper has been to emphasize not just the level of an
energy tax but to think about the time path of such a tax. The evolution of the tax should
reflect the problem that CO2 emissions accumulate in the atmosphere over time. It should also
incorporate the aspect that the source of CO2 emissions, fossil fuel, is an exhaustible resource.
In addition, we have shown that the slope of the tax rate on its optimal path should be higher
if fossil fuels are not used in an efficient manner. We finally addressed the problem of CO2
accumulation, SO2 accumulation, the exhaustibility of fossil fuels and the need of abatement
measures by introducing two taxes. The message turned out to be rather simple; do tax energy
because of its exhaustibility and source of CO2 emissions and use a separate tax on SO2
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emissions to enhance its abatement. We also explored the idea of a first rising and later falling
tax over time, first favored by Ulph and Ulph (1994). With positive discounting producers
need to face a higher specific tax in the future than today to bring about the same reduction in
energy use. If the CO2-fill capacity is nearly exhausted and CO2 emissions are not permitted
in the years to come, a unit of CO2 emitted at a later date contributes less to marginal damage
and should be taxed less, especially as a backstop technology is close anyway.
Our main intention was to use a basic micro model of an industry which maximizes
profits, uses energy as one of its inputs and is confronted with a varying energy tax. The firm
reacts by substitution, changing its output level, by investing in energy efficient technology or
by purchasing abatement equipment. The government is well aware about firms reaction on
price signals. It maximizes a stream of social welfare by choosing an optimal path of its
instrument – an energy tax. We find that our tax rate is the same as the one derived from the
model of an energy extracting benevolent government.
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Appendix
Proof of (18)-(21):
In order to evaluate the slopes of the two equations of motion (13) and (14) near the steady
state we choose the specification (22)-(24) given in section 2. We then differentiate each of
the equations of motion (26) and (28) with respect to each of the included variables. For
example, for the ( , )R Rq q R  equation,
( )R Rd q r d q d Rd g= + +&
and for the ( , )RR q R  equation
Rq R
d R d R e E d qd= - × - × ×&
where 0
Rq
E < , using (27).
Next we verify (18) as the slope of the 0Rq =&  equation at the steady state:
(18’) 0R
d q
d R r
g
d
= - <
+
and of the 0R =&  equation
(19’) 0
R
R
q
d q
d R e E
d
= - >
×
.
In order to verify (20), i.e. the motions off the steady state, we obtain for the 0Rq =&  equation
(20’) 0, 0R R
R
q q
r
q R
d g
¶ ¶
= + > = >
¶ ¶
& &
and for the 0R =&  equation,
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(21’) 0, 0
Rq
R
R R
e E
q R
d
¶ ¶
= - × > = - <
¶ ¶
& &
.
Proof of (32) to (35):
The system (31), but with total differentiation with respect to all three exogenous variables, is:
(A1)
* * * *
* *
( ) ( )
, ( 1).
R
R R R
q R p
r d q d R q d r q d DE R d
E d q d R D E d E d p e
d g d g
d d
+ + = - - + -
- - = - + =
The determinant of the characteristic matrix of this system is
( ) 0
Rq
D r Ed d g= - + × + × < .
By Cramer’s rule ( 0 0)d d d pd g= = = = :
( )
**
*1 1 0
0
RR
R
qd q
q
d r D D
g
d
d
-
= = <
-
and
( )
**
*1 1 0
0 R
R
R
q R
q
r qd R
E q
Ed r D D
d+ -
= = - × <
-
which proves (32). Similarly ( 0)d r d d pg= = = :
( )
**
*1 1 0RR R
qd q
q DE
d D DDE
g
d g
dd
-
= = × + × <
--
because the positive term DEg ×  dominates the small negative term *Rq d . Furthermore,
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( )
** 1 1
( ) 0
R
R
R
q R
q
r qd R
r DE E q
Ed D DDE
d
d
d
+ - -
= = + + × >
- -
because the positive term ( )r DEd+  dominates the small negative term 
Rq R
E q× . This
proves (33). Next ( 0)d r d d pd= = = :
( )
* 1 1
( ) 0
0
R DE Rd q DE R
d D D
g
d
dg
-
= = - - >
-
and
( )
* 1 1
( ) 0
0 RR
q
q
r DE Rd R
E DE R
Ed D D
d
g
+ -
= = - >
-
which proves (34).
Finally ( 0)d r d dd g= = = :
( )
* 01 1
0R p
p
d q
E
Ed p D D
g
g
d
= = - × >
-
since 0pE >  as the derived demand for energy.
* 01 1
( ) 0
R
p
q p
rd R
r E
E Ed p D D
d
d
+
= = + <
-
which proves (35).
35
Proof of (61)
0
( ( ) )
0
E x ef E
E E E E
R RF
E E E E
d x PE PE d ef d ef d E
H p x C NE C E
d ef d d d
d d ef d E d E d E
PE E q e q
d ef d d d d
t tt t t t t
a
a
t t t t
æ ö¶ ¶
= - - × + - + +ç ÷¶ ¶è ø
æ ö
- + - × - =ç ÷
è ø
Because of 
1
, (58),
1x E
PE
p C
t a
¶
= =
¶¶ -
 and 
1
NE
E
a
=
-
, we obtain
0
E E
E R RF
E
d ef d E
E
d d
e q q PE
d E
d
a a
t t
t
t
æ ö
¢ +ç ÷
è ø= × + + ×
which can be written as in (62) if we use the definition of the three elasticities given in (62).
